Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 57. Missed: 16. Coverage: 78.1%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (63.38% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1057 – enumerate process modules
• T1027 – encrypt or decrypt data via BCrypt
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1082 – get memory capacity
• T1055.001 – inject dll
• T1057 – enumerate threads
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1027 – reference Base64 string
• T1082 – get CPU information
• T1083 – get Program Files directory
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1082 – get system information on Windows
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1518 – get installed programs
• T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1083 – get file size
• T1027 – encode data using Base64 via WinAPI
• T1055.003 – inject thread
• T1620 – inject thread
• T1083 – enumerate files recursively
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1105 – download and write a file
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1113 – capture screenshot
• T1027 – encrypt data using DPAPI
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1055.003 – hijack thread execution
• T1620 – hijack thread execution
• T1003 – Steals private information from local Internet browsers
• T1555 – Steals private information from local Internet browsers
• T1552 – Steals private information from local Internet browsers
• T1555.003 – Steals private information from local Internet browsers
• T1552.001 – Steals private information from local Internet browsers
• T1564 – A process created a hidden window
• T1564.003 – A process created a hidden window
• T1082 – Collects information about installed applications
• T1082 – Collects information to fingerprint the system
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1057 – Expresses interest in specific running processes
• T1057 – Enumerates running processes
• T1012 – Collects information about installed applications
• T1012 – Collects information to fingerprint the system
• T1518 – Collects information about installed applications
• T1071 – Attempts to connect to a dead IP:Port
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1071 – Suspicious communication with abused trusted site
• T1071 – Performs HTTP requests potentially not found in PCAP.
• T1071 – Terminates another process
• T1071 – Network activity contains more than one unique useragent.
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1573 – Establishes an encrypted HTTPS connection containing a suspicious or fake User Agent
• T1573 – Establishes an encrypted HTTPS connection
• T1573 – Fake User-Agent detected
• T1005 – Steals private information from local Internet browsers
• T1185 – CAPE detected injection into a browser process, likely for Man-In-Browser (MITB) infostealing
• T1005 – Searches for sensitive browser data
• T1005 – Reads sensitive browser data
• T1005 – Searches for cryptocurrency wallet locations
• T1012 – Reads system data
• T1012 – Query OS Information
• T1012 – Reads installed applications
• T1012 – Possibly does reconnaissance
• T1020 – Uses HTTP to upload a large amount of data
• T1055 – Writes into the memory of another process
• T1055 – Modifies control flow of another process
• T1056 – Combination of other detections shows multiple input capture behaviors
• T1057 – Enumerates running processes
• T1071.001 – Uses HTTP to upload a large amount of data
• T1082 – Reads system data
• T1082 – Query OS Information
• T1082 – Query CPU Properties
• T1082 – Reads installed applications
• T1083 – Searches for sensitive browser data
• T1083 – Possibly does reconnaissance
• T1083 – Reads sensitive browser data
• T1083 – Searches for cryptocurrency wallet locations
• T1113 – Takes screenshot
• T1119 – Searches for sensitive browser data
• T1119 – Reads sensitive browser data
• T1119 – Searches for cryptocurrency wallet locations
• T1119 – Combination of other detections shows multiple input capture behaviors
• T1497 – Creates an unusually large number of processes
• T1518.001 – Tries to detect the presence of antivirus software
• T1552.001 – Searches for sensitive browser data
• T1552.001 – Reads sensitive browser data
• T1552.001 – Searches for cryptocurrency wallet locations
• T1553 – Allows invalid SSL certificates
• T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1071 – Some process has originated direct HTTPS traffic with one or more hosts.
• T1059 – Apparent Internal Usage of CMD.EXE
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1071 – C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.