Vilsel/Qilin-Tagged Dropper Installed Under Acrobat DC Program Path


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-20 07:44:03 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
~Acrobat.exe
Type
Win32 Executable (generic)
SHA‑1
0eca704d0d37d8e435734af79e9e113212476efa
MD5
2fa9543234e869a924afe323324300c1
First Seen
2025-11-14 13:17:19.913833
Last Analysis
2025-11-14 15:03:12.844923
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-11-06 18:32:56 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-11-18 14:30:48 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 11 days, 19 hours, 57 minutes
2025-11-20 07:44:03 UTC Report generation time 13 days, 13 hours, 11 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 63. Missed: 9. Coverage: 87.5%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +62 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 62 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • TrendMicro
  • VirIT
  • Webroot
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (87.75% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
File System 67543 87.75%
System 7523 9.77%
Process 1826 2.37%
Registry 61 0.08%
Device 4 0.01%
Synchronization 3 0.00%
Network 2 0.00%
Threading 2 0.00%
Services 2 0.00%
Misc 1 0.00%
Windows 1 0.00%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1082 – get disk size
  • T1614 – get geographical location
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1059 – accept command line arguments
  • T1222 – set file attributes
  • T1010 – enumerate gui resources
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1135 – enumerate network shares
  • T1082 – get disk information

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.aieov.com 76.223.54.146 United States Amazon.com, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 4 udp
53 28 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.14 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.0979371070861816 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 51209 5355 3.0247459411621094 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 53401 5355 4.191579103469849 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55094 5355 5.578837156295776 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55848 5355 3.0255091190338135 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 49916 53 98.17264914512634 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 50180 53 145.17673110961914 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 50710 53 65.56251502037048 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 52815 53 6.907439947128296 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 54579 53 51.20383906364441 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 54683 53 192.17241597175598 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 55914 53 126.90676498413086 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 56399 53 173.92212295532227 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 60117 53 79.92206597328186 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 62022 53 159.57018399238586 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 62112 53 36.62570095062256 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 63205 53 206.53211307525635 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 64753 53 112.5472960472107 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 65148 53 22.265646934509277 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 49916 53 97.17471694946289 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 50180 53 144.17253708839417 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 50710 53 64.5631091594696 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 52815 53 7.906722068786621 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 54579 53 50.20419502258301 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 54683 53 191.17414903640747 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 55914 53 125.90716195106506 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 56399 53 172.92244005203247 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 60117 53 78.92264294624329 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 62022 53 158.55829215049744 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 62112 53 35.62541913986206 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 63205 53 205.53241109848022 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 64753 53 111.54801297187805 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 65148 53 21.267894983291626 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

0

Registry Set

3

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Show all (297 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Key Value
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\inet.\Day 13
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\inet.\Month 9
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-575823232-3065301323-1442773979-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\DisableTaskMgr 0

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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