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Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-12-04 08:32:31 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
xsvrm.exe
Type
Win32 Executable MS Visual C++ (generic)
SHA‑1
d026ae3f7ff573a3af4f8b1c09ed2ae8f71e4c68
MD5
fe64eccba2d254b30f3977488f56760d
First Seen
2025-12-02 11:33:18.415278
Last Analysis
2025-12-02 18:56:41.599672
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 7+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a several-hour window that allowed the adversary to complete initial compromise and begin early-stage persistence establishment.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-11-13 21:28:38 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-12-03 21:10:13 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 19 days, 23 hours, 41 minutes
2025-12-04 08:32:31 UTC Report generation time 20 days, 11 hours, 3 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 58. Detected as malicious: 47. Missed: 11. Coverage: 81.0%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +46 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 46 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Alibaba
  • ALYac
  • CMC
  • F-Secure
  • google_safebrowsing
  • MaxSecure
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • VIPRE

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (56.68% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 437 56.68%
File System 242 31.39%
Registry 38 4.93%
Process 26 3.37%
Misc 9 1.17%
Hooking 5 0.65%
Device 5 0.65%
Network 3 0.39%
Threading 2 0.26%
Services 2 0.26%
Crypto 1 0.13%
Synchronization 1 0.13%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1543.003 – create service
  • T1569.002 – create service
  • T1543.003 – start service
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1027 – encrypt data using AES
  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 KSA
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1543.003 – persist via Windows service
  • T1569.002 – persist via Windows service
  • T1222 – set file attributes
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1027 – reference AES constants
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.20 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.
www.aieov.com 76.223.54.146 United States Amazon.com, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 8 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2598469257354736 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.198356866836548 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.2017579078674316 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 4.295780897140503 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.2139968872070312 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 5.7687599658966064 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.20876407623291 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 6.870578050613403 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 5.776210069656372 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56213 53 22.275099992752075 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 63439 53 8.033684968948364 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 7.868869066238403 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 6.7750959396362305 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56213 53 21.27764105796814 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 63439 53 9.025043964385986 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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