WannaCry Payload Masquerading As Diskpart Executable For Stealth


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-12-04 08:31:17 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
ncanr9.exe
Type
Win32 Executable MS Visual C++ (generic)
SHA‑1
b40045fe63a7c13d355c09ac3822c99879a06345
MD5
9b6f499ae84d234cdda68bd477b18c8d
First Seen
2025-12-02 11:33:17.467805
Last Analysis
2025-12-02 18:56:41.569372
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 7+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a several-hour window that allowed the adversary to complete initial compromise and begin early-stage persistence establishment.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-11-25 15:22:54 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-12-03 21:10:01 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 8 days, 5 hours, 47 minutes
2025-12-04 08:31:17 UTC Report generation time 8 days, 17 hours, 8 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 67. Detected as malicious: 62. Missed: 5. Coverage: 92.5%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +61 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 61 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • CMC
  • Google
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • VBA32

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 KSA
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 KSA
  • T1059 – Apparent Internal Usage of CMD.EXE

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.18 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.242079973220825 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.171041965484619 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.173229932785034 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 4.149215936660767 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.181008815765381 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 5.733260869979858 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.178931951522827 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 6.722805976867676 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 5.742362022399902 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 7.710819959640503 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 6.741712808609009 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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