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Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-12-04 08:28:39 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
n5n1hr8.exe
Type
Win32 Executable MS Visual C++ (generic)
SHA‑1
a0bc305236aff1f5b443209ec31d1c33d3bd0b4a
MD5
96cbf28c0f4dfa69d6e98e91a3fced08
First Seen
2025-12-02 11:33:17.452039
Last Analysis
2025-12-02 18:56:41.475059
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 7+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a several-hour window that allowed the adversary to complete initial compromise and begin early-stage persistence establishment.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-11-07 20:44:23 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-12-03 21:09:38 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 26 days, 0 hours, 25 minutes
2025-12-04 08:28:39 UTC Report generation time 26 days, 11 hours, 44 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 64. Missed: 9. Coverage: 87.7%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +63 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 63 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • Google
  • google_safebrowsing
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • TACHYON
  • ViRobot
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (49.66% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
File System 190403 49.66%
Synchronization 170842 44.56%
System 11904 3.10%
Registry 7764 2.02%
Process 905 0.24%
Com 522 0.14%
Crypto 433 0.11%
Windows 249 0.06%
Misc 161 0.04%
Threading 108 0.03%
Network 70 0.02%
Device 61 0.02%
Hooking 11 0.00%
Services 4 0.00%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1027 – encrypt data using AES
  • T1027 – reference AES constants
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1027 – encrypt or decrypt via WinCrypt
  • T1027 – create new key via CryptAcquireContext
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 KSA
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1083 – check if file exists

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.aieov.com 13.248.169.48 United States Amazon Technologies Inc.
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.18 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 32 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2421789169311523 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.170759916305542 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.172975778579712 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 4.291466951370239 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.181506872177124 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 6.023432970046997 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.17948579788208 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51628 53 114.16338682174683 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51663 53 175.85155582427979 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 7.5694739818573 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51880 53 208.60153198242188 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 6.118518829345703 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56213 53 37.4923038482666 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56473 53 99.80385494232178 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56666 53 222.99198579788208 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 58917 53 81.08569693565369 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 59770 53 52.195191860198975 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 60334 53 128.52247500419617 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 61507 53 146.8360149860382 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 62120 53 161.36627984046936 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 62329 53 66.63280487060547 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 63439 53 22.975753784179688 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 63550 53 194.24176692962646 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51628 53 113.17407393455505 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51663 53 174.86365580558777 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 8.569621801376343 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51880 53 207.61556386947632 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 7.116328954696655 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56213 53 36.5023398399353 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56473 53 98.8189549446106 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56666 53 221.9999167919159 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 58917 53 80.0970299243927 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 59770 53 51.20905590057373 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 60334 53 127.53534197807312 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 61507 53 145.83868384361267 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 62120 53 160.36839485168457 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 62329 53 65.63857793807983 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 63439 53 21.988175868988037 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 63550 53 193.24944877624512 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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