WannaCryptor Loader Masquerading As Cliconfg Executable For Stealth


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-12-04 08:27:28 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
a143nt5.exe
Type
Microsoft Visual C++ compiled executable (generic)
SHA‑1
34532f4fda060a96587334433b70ca6f8474b153
MD5
3f59a8f5fa8aacf9a6445680d14a4e8b
First Seen
2025-12-01 14:09:02.743325
Last Analysis
2025-12-01 21:28:47.286572
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 7+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a several-hour window that allowed the adversary to complete initial compromise and begin early-stage persistence establishment.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-11-09 12:40:40 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-12-03 21:10:58 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 24 days, 8 hours, 30 minutes
2025-12-04 08:27:28 UTC Report generation time 24 days, 19 hours, 46 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 57. Missed: 16. Coverage: 78.1%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +56 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 56 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • APEX
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • google_safebrowsing
  • huorong
  • SentinelOne
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • TrendMicro
  • VirIT
  • ViRobot
  • Webroot
  • ZoneAlarm

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (69.57% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 16 69.57%
File System 3 13.04%
Process 2 8.70%
Registry 2 8.70%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1083 – get common file path

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.20 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.msftncsi.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.275364875793457 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 49311 5355 5.772181987762451 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 3.174182891845703 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 5.181607007980347 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 3.1818370819091797 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 4.809757947921753 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 3.1990320682525635 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54879 53 7.8347320556640625 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 7.617486953735352 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54879 53 8.834574937820435 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 8.61623501777649 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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