Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 7+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a several-hour window that allowed the adversary to complete initial compromise and begin early-stage persistence establishment.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 62. Missed: 11. Coverage: 84.9%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

The malware’s primary focus is on misc operations (40.00% of total behavior), suggesting specialized functionality targeting this system component.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1010 – find graphical window
• T1033 – get token membership
• T1083 – enumerate files recursively
• T1083 – get file size
• T1614.001 – identify system language via API
• T1027 – reference AES constants
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1115 – open clipboard
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1070.006 – timestomp file
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1564.003 – hide graphical window
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 KSA
• T1071 – The PE file contains an overlay
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1564.003 – hide graphical window
• T1033 – get token membership
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1083 – get file size
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1614.001 – identify system language via API
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1115 – open clipboard
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES
• T1027 – reference AES constants
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 KSA
• T1010 – find graphical window
• T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
• T1027.002 – Manalize Local SandBox BTC Addres found
• T1027.002 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
• T1027.002 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
• T1070.006 – timestomp file
• T1059 – Apparent Internal Usage of CMD.EXE
• T1083 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
• T1027.005 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
• T1070.006 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
• T1564.003 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
• T1027.002 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
• T1129 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
• T1033 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
• T1115 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
• T1614 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
• T1027 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
• T1010 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
• T1614.001 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
• T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
• T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.