Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 71. Detected as malicious: 56. Missed: 15. Coverage: 78.9%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (51.54% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1113 – capture screenshot
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1105 – download and write a file
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1083 – check if directory exists
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1070.004 – self delete
• T1033 – Collects and encrypts information about the computer likely to send to C2 server
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1560 – Collects and encrypts information about the computer likely to send to C2 server
• T1047 – Checks if Antivirus program is installed (via WMI)
• T1047 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1547.001 – Creates an autostart registry key
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1497 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1140 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
• T1518.001 – Checks if Antivirus program is installed (via WMI)
• T1518.001 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1082 – Checks the free space of harddrives
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1560 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1571 – Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
• T1071 – C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.