Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 58. Missed: 14. Coverage: 80.6%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (66.84% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1082 – get disk size
• T1070.004 – self delete
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1083 – check if directory exists
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1113 – capture screenshot
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1105 – download and write a file
• T1033 – Collects and encrypts information about the computer likely to send to C2 server
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1560 – Collects and encrypts information about the computer likely to send to C2 server
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1083 – check if directory exists
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1113 – capture screenshot
• T1105 – download and write a file
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1027.002 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1125 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1057 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1082 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1112 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1529 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1547.009 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1083 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1497 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1564.003 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1134 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1115 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1129 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1027 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1059 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1010 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1012 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1497.001 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1222 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1518 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1047 – Checks if Antivirus program is installed (via WMI)
• T1047 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1547.001 – Creates an autostart registry key
• T1055 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1140 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1518.001 – Checks if Antivirus program is installed (via WMI)
• T1518.001 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1057 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1082 – Checks the free space of harddrives
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1560 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1571 – Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
• T1071 – C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.