Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 62. Missed: 11. Coverage: 84.9%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (67.60% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1083 – get common file path
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1105 – download and write a file
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1070.004 – self delete
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
• T1113 – capture screenshot
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1033 – Collects and encrypts information about the computer likely to send to C2 server
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1070.006 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1070.006 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1070.006 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1070 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1070 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1070 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1560 – Collects and encrypts information about the computer likely to send to C2 server
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
• T1082 – Queries for the computername
• T1012 – The process tried to collect informations about the system reading some known registry keys
• T1082 – The process tried to collect informations about the system reading some known registry keys
• T1047 – Checks if Antivirus program is installed (via WMI)
• T1047 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1055 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1140 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1518.001 – Checks if Antivirus program is installed (via WMI)
• T1518.001 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1057 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1082 – Checks the free space of harddrives
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1560 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1071 – C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.