Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 62. Missed: 11. Coverage: 84.9%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (36.25% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1083 – get file size
• T1546.001 – persist via default file association registry key
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1059 – accept command line arguments
• T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1057 – Enumerates the modules from a process (may be used to locate base addresses in process injection)
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – Creates a slightly modified copy of itself
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1486 – Exhibits possible ransomware or wiper file modification behavior: mass_file_deletion overwrites_existing_files
• T1485 – Anomalous file deletion behavior detected (10+)
• T1547.001 – Creates an undocumented autostart registry key
• T1036 – Drops executable to common a third party application directory
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1497 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
• T1562.001 – Drops or copies MsMpEng.exe (Windows Defender, likely to bypass HIPS)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1027 – .NET source code contains long base64-encoded strings
• T1070.006 – Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
• T1056 – Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)
• T1056 – Sample has functionality to log and monitor keystrokes, analyze it with the keystroke simulation cookbook
• T1518.001 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
• T1083 – Enumerates the file system
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1080 – Infects executable files (exe, dll, sys, html)
• T1071 – C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.