Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 61. Missed: 12. Coverage: 83.6%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1083 – check if directory exists
• T1547.009 – persist via lnk shortcut
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
• T1070.004 – self delete
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
• T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1113 – capture screenshot
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1105 – download and write a file
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
• T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
• T1057 – find process by PID

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.